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ELD-026        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1271 
___________ 
 
KEITH DOUGHERTY; KEITH DOUGHERTY INVESTMENTS &  
CONSULTING LLC (SMLLC) ASSIGNEE OF BILL'S MECHANICAL AND 
WELDING, (Fictitious Name) SOLE PROPRIETOR LARRY RUNK, II 
 
v. 
 
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, also known as Erie Insurance;  
GREG GARRITY, Erie Agent; JIM BURKHOLDER;  
ROBERT SIMMONDS, Erie Investigator;  
NICOLE R. GEHRET, Erie Sr. Liability Adjuster;  
R. G. SMITH, Cumberland County Insurance Fraud Investigator;  
CUMBERLAND INSURANCE FRAUD UNIT 
 
       Keith Dougherty; 
       Larry Runk, II, 
          Appellants 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-00480) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Frederick Motz 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
April 30, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, SLOVITER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 22, 2015)
 2 
 
_________ 
 
O P I N I O N* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Keith Dougherty and Larry Runk II appeal from the order of the District Court 
denying reconsideration of its dismissal of their complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 In Dougherty’s appeal at C.A. No. 15-1123, we separately address his attempt to 
assert a claim that Runk purportedly assigned to him.  This appeal concerns one of 
Dougherty’s attempts to represent Runk’s interests more directly.  In this case, Dougherty 
and Runk filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and later filed an amended complaint 
(which, like all their other joint filings, appears to have been prepared by Dougherty).  
The amended complaint is premised on a dispute between Runk and Erie Insurance 
Exchange (“Erie Insurance”) regarding insurance claims that Runk submitted following 
an automobile accident and on an apparently related Pennsylvania criminal proceeding in 
which Runk is being prosecuted for insurance fraud.1   
 Plaintiffs named as defendants Erie Insurance, certain of its employees, the 
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, District Attorney Insurance Fraud Unit, and one of its 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Runk has been charged with insurance fraud, theft by deception and other offenses in 
the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Cumberland County at No. CP-21-CR-
0001189-2014.  Those charges remain pending. 
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investigators.  (Plaintiffs’ filings in this Court also purport to identify as defendants the 
Cumberland County Chief Deputy District Attorney and two state-court judges, but they  
were not parties to this proceeding in the District Court.)  The amended complaint is not a 
model of clarity, but plaintiffs appear to allege that Erie Insurance conspired with 
Cumberland County investigators to bring unfounded charges against Runk in order to 
coerce him into accepting an undervalued settlement of his claims and that the Insurance 
Fraud Unit has denied him due process by conducting an inadequate investigation and by 
pressuring him to plead guilty to a “legally impossible” crime.  The amended complaint 
requests $5 million in damages and injunctive relief, apparently against Runk’s continued 
prosecution. 
 As for Dougherty’s alleged interest in this dispute, the amended complaint alleges 
that Dougherty and Runk “have engaged in long term business dealings” and that Runk 
“has been forced to seek Keith Dougherty’s assistance in protecting his/their mutual 
rights in the Courts of PA” because Runk has been mistreated by lawyers in the past.  
(ECF No. 5 at 8-9 ¶¶ 8, 9.)  The amended complaint further alleges that Dougherty has 
“purchased” Runk’s claim against Erie Insurance (id. at 13 ¶ 20), and it attaches the same 
agreement between Dougherty and Runk that we address in C.A. No. 15-1123 (ECF No. 
5-1 at 58-60).   
 Several defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds, inter 
alia, that it fails to state a claim and that the purported assignment of Runk’s claim 
against Erie Insurance to Dougherty is champertous.  The District Court dismissed the 
amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and then later denied by 
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text-only orders plaintiffs’ several post-judgment motions, including their motions for 
reconsideration and to disqualify the District Judge.  Both Dougherty and Runk appeal 
from those rulings.2 
II. 
 In dismissing the amended complaint, the District Court focused on Dougherty 
and noted that Runk’s purported assignment of his claim to Dougherty appears to be 
champertous.  That assignment is indeed champertous for the reasons we explain in C.A. 
No. 15-1123, so Dougherty is not permitted to litigate any claims that Runk may have 
against Erie Insurance.  Dougherty also does not have standing to challenge Runk’s 
alleged denial of due process in his ongoing criminal proceeding.  We will affirm the  
dismissal of the amended complaint as to Dougherty for these reasons.   
 As for Runk, the District Court did not identify his potential claims but, having 
done so ourselves, we agree that the amended complaint does not set forth a plausible 
claim for relief.3  Plaintiffs already have amended their complaint once and nothing 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Plaintiffs’ appeal from the order denying 
reconsideration brings up for review the underlying order dismissing the amended 
complaint.  See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 n.20 (3d Cir. 2012).  
We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) and 
ask whether it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted).  In doing so, we may review certain 
documents attached to the complaint.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 
2010).  To the extent that plaintiffs’ filings can be read to challenge the District Judge’s 
denial of their post-judgment motion for disqualification, we review that ruling for abuse 
of discretion and discern none here.  See United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 717 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). 
3 Plaintiffs’ allegations are largely conclusory and inadequate on their face but, even if 
properly supported, they still would fail to state a claim as a matter of law.  Runk’s only 
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contained in their amended complaint or their filings on appeal suggests that Runk could 
further amend the complaint to assert a plausible claim.  Thus, we will affirm the 
dismissal of the amended complaint as to Runk for failure to state a claim. 
 We close by noting one concern.  The style and content of plaintiffs’ joint filings 
suggest that they were prepared by Dougherty.  Although Runk apparently has adopted 
them as his own by signing them, it appears that Dougherty may be engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law.4  Thus, it may be that Dougherty’s apparent advice has led 
Runk astray and jeopardized whatever claims Runk may legitimately have against Erie 
                                                                                                                                                  
conceivable federal claim against Erie Insurance would appear to be that it conspired 
with the Insurance Fraud Unit to maliciously prosecute him without probable cause in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  One of the elements of such a claim is the termination of the proceeding in 
the accused’s favor, see id., and Runk has not alleged and cannot allege that here.  Runk’s 
claims for damages against the Insurance Fraud Unit fails for the same reason.  Finally, 
as for Runk’s apparent request for an injunction against his prosecution, federal courts 
“must not intervene by way of either injunction or declaratory judgment in a pending 
state criminal prosecution” absent exceptional circumstances not alleged here.  Kugler v. 
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123 (1975) (discussing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).   
 
4 Both the Erie Insurance defendants and the District Court raised this concern, and we 
share it.  The agreement between Dougherty and Runk states that Dougherty will provide 
Runk with “recommendations and representation in the efforts to collect bad debt” with 
the “specific intent” of instituting legal proceedings (ECF No. 5-1 at 58), and the 
amended complaint alleges that Dougherty is assisting Runk “in protecting his/their 
mutual rights in the Courts of PA” (ECF No. 5 at 8-9 ¶ 9).  In addition, plaintiffs have 
attached to their motion for a preliminary injunction in this Court the transcript of an 
August 28, 2014 hearing in Runk’s criminal proceeding.  At the hearing, the Cumberland 
County Chief Deputy District Attorney informed the trial court that Dougherty (who was 
present in the courtroom) had been “injecting himself in this case in filing motions” and 
that “I am going to tell you right now, he is under investigation for unauthorized practice 
of law.  Mr. Runk is seriously in jeopardy from his advice.”  (Mot. for Preliminary 
Injunction, “Transcript” at 5-6.)  We express no opinion on whether Dougherty in fact 
has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
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Insurance (an issue on which we express no opinion).  The District Court noted 
Dougherty’s apparent unauthorized practice of law but did not take any measures to 
protect Runk’s potential rights.  We see no need to do so now because Runk has long 
been on notice of these concerns and has filed nothing personally in either the District 
Court or this one disavowing Dougherty’s filings or attempting to assert anything other 
than the claims contained therein.  If Runk believes that he has legitimate claims to assert 
in the future, he would be well advised to assert them without Dougherty’s assistance.  
See Dougherty v. Snyder, 469 F. App’x 71, 73 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (noting that 
Dougherty’s legal arguments “serve only to demonstrate the wisdom” of the requirement 
that business entities be represented by counsel in federal court). 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Appellants’ 
motions pending in this Court are denied.5 
                                              
5 We have reviewed the arguments contained in appellants’ various filings, including 
their arguments that the assignment of Dougherty’s prior appeals to certain panels of this 
Court was the product of a “political conspiracy” to deny his claims, and conclude that 
they lack merit for reasons that do not require discussion. 
